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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RANDY L. TIPPETS,

:

Petitioner/Appellant,

:

v.

:

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE,

:

Case No. 20070246-CA

Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT - APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Tippets failed to marshal the evidence to support his challenge to the
administrative findings of fact in both his administrative appeal and before this Court.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. The Department of Commerce (Department)
accepted the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing's (Division) findings of
fact because the petitioner failed in his duty to marshal the evidence that supported those
findings. R. 6-7.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The decision of the Department should be reviewed
for abuse of discretion. It is within the discretion of a reviewing court to determine what
1

remedy to impose upon a party that fails in its duty to marshal the evidence. Martinez v.
Media/PavmasterJPlus, 2007 UT 42,1fl[20-21, 164 P.3d 384. That same discretion should
be applied to the Department where it was following its regulation imposing the duty of
marshaling the evidence upon a party filing an administrative appeal.
2. Petitioner cannot raise new evidence and arguments that were not presented in
the original administrative proceeding before the Division.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. The Department rejected the petitioner's efforts
to raise these new matters on administrative appeal. R. 14-15.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The determination that issues were not adequately
raised in the administrative proceeding is a conclusion of law and is reviewed for
correction of error. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998).
3. Counsel for the Division's mistake in saying methamphetamines instead of
amphetamines during opening statement (Tr. Vol. I at 12) did not substantially prejudice
the petitioner.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was considered and rejected by the
Deparment. R. 11 n.5.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:A court can grant relief from agency action only on a
showing the petitioner has suffered substantial prejudice. Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-16(4)
(West 2004). This "substantial prejudice" requirement has been equated with "harmful
error" Morton Int'L Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 58L 584 (Utah 1991)
(superseded on other grounds by Utah Code Ann. §59-l-610(l)(b) (West 2004)).
2

4. Petitioner was not prejudiced by the limited discussion of his expunged
criminal record. The Administrative Law Judge upheld petitioner's objection to this
evidence and the Division's decision was not based upon the expunged record.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was considered and rejected by the
Department. R. 11-14.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An agency's interpretation of general questions of
law is reviewed for correctness. Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil. Gas and Mining,
2001 UT 112,1|18, 38 P.3d 291.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Appendix A to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 27, 2004, the Division filed a Notice of Agency Action against Randy
Tippets. R. 120-37. The Notice alleged four counts of misconduct on the part of the
petitioner. R. 127-28. A formal hearing was held before the Division and its State Board
of Pharmacy on February 28, 2006 and March 1, 2006. Tr. Vol I and II.
The Division's Administrative Law Judge entered his findings of fact conclusions
of law and recommended order on May 24, 2006. The Division's decision only found the
second and third counts of misconduct to be supported by the evidence. The Division
found that these findings of misconduct merited the revocation of both petitioner's license
to practice as a pharmacist and his license to dispense controlled substances. R. 61-72.
The Division entered its order adopting the ALJ's recommended order that same day. R.
3

60. Petitioner sought agency review of the Division's order on June 23, 2006. R. 59. On
administrative appeal, the Department upheld the Division's decision in its findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order on review of February 20, 2007. R. 1-17. Petitioner's
writ of review was filed with this Court on March 19, 2007.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The following facts are taken from the Department's findings of fact. R. 2-3.
Tippets was a pharmacist licensed to practice in the State of Utah who was also
licensed to dispense controlled substances. His license to dispense controlled substances
was suspended on October 27, 1988, pending further order of the Division. On January
31, 1989, Tippets' licenses to practice as a pharmacist and to dispense controlled
substances were suspended for six months pursuant to a disciplinary action by the
Division, and the petitioner was placed on probation for a period of five years. R. 2, ^flb.
The conditions and terms of Tippets' probation were modified on February 10,
1992 and his licenses were reinstated in full on March 23, 1994. R. 2, ^}lc.
During October, 2003, petitioner became employed by Dan's Pharmacy. After
completing an evening shift on October 22, 2003, Tippets remained in the pharmacy until
the next morning. He was discovered by his supervisor, sitting in the back office with a
fan blowing on him. Dan's Pharmacy conducted a controlled substance audit on October
23, 2003, subsequently filing a theft and loss report for Alprazolam, Phentermine, and
Methylphenidate with the DEA. It also suspended petitioner's employment. R. 3, ^|lf.

4

Petitioner's urine drug test conducted on October 24, 2003 revealed the presence
of amphetamines for which he had no lawful prescription. R. 3, fig.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In his administrative appeal, petitioner failed to marshal the evidence that
supported the Division's findings of fact. This failure permitted the Department, in its
discretion, to accept the Division's findings as conclusive. The Department's decision
was not an abuse of discretion. Indeed, petitioner has failed to marsh;

evidence that

supports the administrative findings of fact in his brief to this Court. The Department's
factual findings should therefore be upheld on appeal.
It was petitioner's duty to raise all of his claims and present all of his evidence in
the formal hearing before the Division. Any issues not presented there were waived. The
Department did not err in its refusal to consider new issues and evidence that was not
raised before the Division.
Petitioner has failed to show how a single misstatement by counsel for the
Division in his opening statement prejudiced the petitioner. The use of the word
methamphetamine, when all knew that the correct word was amphetamine, was harmless
error. Evidence of the petitioner's expunged criminal record was not accepted by the
ALJ, even though the applicable statute permits the Division to use such evidence. The
mere mention of the evidence, where it was not relied upon by the Division in reaching its
decision, did not deny any right of the petitioner.

5

ARGUMENT
I. TIPPETS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE THAT
SUPPORTED THE CHALLENGED FINDINGS OF FACT BOTH
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT AND BEFORE THIS COURT
A party challenging administrative findings of fact has a duty to marshal the
evidence that supports those findings.
Furthermore, when challenging an agency action as not based upon
substantial evidence, appellants have a duty to marshal all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the
[Board's] findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
Road Runner Oil. Inc. v. Bd. of Oil Gas and Mining. 2003 UT App 275,1(10, 76 P.3d
692 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Covey v. Covey. 2003
UT App 380,1J27, 80 P.3d 553 ("In order to successfully challenge the trial court's
findings of fact, Almon must first marshal all the evidence in support of the findingfs] and
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding[s] even
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below.") (internal quotations
omitted).
The Department, by has regulation established this same duty on the part of a party
challenging a finding of fact made by the Division.
If a party challenges a finding of fact in the order subject to review,
the party must demonstrate, based on the entire record, that the finding is
not supported by substantial evidence. A party challenging the facts bears
the burden to marshal or gather all of the evidence in support of a finding
and to show that despite such evidence, the finding is not supported by
substantial evidence. The failure to so marshal the evidence permits the
executive director to accept a division's findings of fact as conclusive.
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Utah Admin. Code Rl 51 -46b- 12(3)(c).
Such a regulation has the effect of law. Utah Code Ann. 63-46a-3.5(2) (West
2004) ("An agency's written statement that is made as a rule in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter is enforceable and has the effect of law.15). The discretion
given to the executive director of the Department is the same discretion given to appellate
courts to determine what remedy to impose where a party fails to meet his duty to marshal
the evidence. Martinez. 2007 UT 4

il 1flJ20-2l.

A review of the petitioner's pleadings before the Department shows that he did not
meet his burden to marshal the evidence. R. 18-32, 47-49, 59. Nor has the petitioner
marshaled the evidence that supports the administrative findings of fact in I lis brie1

^fore

this Court. Instead he cites to the evidence that he feels supports his claims and
disregards all other evidence. Brief of the Appellant at 9-11.
The Department did not abuse its discretion when it ruled tllat tlc Division's
findings of fact were conclusive where the petitioner failed to marshal the evidence in
support of the findings. This decision should be affirmed on appeal.
II. THE DEPARTMENT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO CONSU I IN!
ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE NOT RAISED BEFORE THE
DIVISION
Only after the Division's order had been entered did petitioner seek to raise certain
new arguments and evidence. On administrative appeal to the Department, he sought to
present evidence of a Brazilian diet drug that might have explained the results of his drug
test. He also sought to claim for the first time that the agency action against him was
7

retaliatory in nature. R. 14. The Department correctly refused to consider this new
argument or this new evidence.
The Executive Director applies the same standards for agency review
as those used for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings. Utah
Admin. Code Rl 51-46b-12(7). "The appellate court shall grant relief only
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced . . . " Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b~16(4) (emphasis added). Moreover, the record on appeal may be
supplemented only "because of an omission or exclusion, or a dispute as to
the accuracy of reporting, and not to introduce new material into the record.
State v. Law, 2003 UT App 228,1f2, 75 P.3d 923, citing Olson v. ParkCraig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis
added).
R. 14.
The Department's regulation relied upon by the Executive Director has the force of
law. Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-3.5(2) (West 2004). The Department correctly applied the
law in refusing to consider the new material that petitioner sought to raise in his
administrative appeal. The same is true of the new issues petitioner sought to raise.
[A] party seeking review of agency action must raise an issue before that
agency to preserve the issue for further review. It is well settled that
"persons aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies 'may not, by
refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such agencies, by-pass
them, and call upon the courts to determine matters properly determinable
originally by such agencies/ "
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998).
The Department's review of the Division's Order uses, by regulation, the same
standards that apply on judicial review of the Department's final agency order. Petitioner
was required to present all of his evidence and claims before the Division. He could not
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by-pass that hearing and seek to raise new claims or evidence before the Department or
before this Court. The Department correctly rejected his efforts to appeal from the
Division's decision based on materials not part of the agency record. This decision
should be affirmed on appeal.
III. I HE MISTAKEN USE OF THE WORD METHAMPHETAMINE
IS NOT GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL
Petitioner asks this Court to reverse the administrative decision based on a single
slip of the tongue. In his opening statement, counsel for the Division stated that Tippets'
drug test came back positive for methamphetamine instead of for amphetamine. Tr. Vol.
I at 12. Such a misstatement does not rise to the level of reversible error. A court can
grant relief from agency action only on a showing the petitioner has suffered substantial
prejudice. Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-16(4) (West 2004). This "substantial prejudice"
requirement has been equated with "harmful error." Morton Int'K Inc. v. State Tax
Gommln, 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991) (superseded on other grounds by Utah Code
Ann. §59-l-610(l)(b) (West 2004)) ( "[A]n error will be harmless if it is 'sufficiently
inconsequential that... there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the
outcome of the proceedings.5").
Tippets has not claimed that the agency action against him was based on the
erroneous belief that he had tested positive for methamphetamine instead of for
amphetamine. Both the Division and the Department correctly held that the positive test
results were for amphetamine. R. 3, 66. The Department did not err in finding that

9

counsel's mistake was at best harmless error. R. 11 n.5. No substantial prejudice was
shown by the petitioner and the Department's decision should be affirmed on appeal.
IV. PETITIONER WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE LIMITED
DISCUSSION OF HIS EXPUNGED CRIMINAL RECORD
In testifying concerning the petitioner's disciplinary record, a Division investigator
mentioned that there was no further information available concerning Tippets' 1988
disciplinary action because the related criminal record had been expunged. Tr. Vol. I at
168. Petitioner asked that his expunged records not be unsealed and made available to the
Board. Tr. Vol. I at 186-87. At the beginning of the second day of the hearing, the ALJ
ruled that the expunged records would not be permitted in evidence. Tr. Vol. II at 262.
He also instructed the Board that it was not to speculate as to the reason that the
expungement existed and the members of the Board were not to consider the
expungement in considering this matter. Tr. Vol. II at 262-63. "There won't be any
further testimony offered in this case as to that matter because it's simply not properly
before the Board and no further inquiries about it would be appropriate." Tr. Vol. II at
263.
Towards the conclusion of the hearing the ALJ again reminded the participants
that the expunged material was not before the Board and "the contents of the documents
can neither be assumed to be favorable or disfavorable to either party in this proceeding."
Tr. Vol. II at 492. The Division's decision does not mention the expungement. The
Department did not rely upon the expungement in reaching its decision. Instead, the

10

Department reviewed the mentions of the expungement before the Division and
determined that they constituted harmless error. R. 11-14.
The Division had the right to rely on the expunged records if it so desired. By
statute the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing is one of five state
agencies that have the right to obtain expunged records without a court order. Utah Code
Ann. §77-18-15(2) (West 2004). The only restriction on the Division's use of expunged
records is that it must give the subject of the records a reasonable opportunity U»
challenge and explain the information contained therein and to challenge its relevancy to
the proceeding before the Division. Utah Code Ann. §77-18-15(4) (West 2004). No right
of the petitioner would have been violated by the admission of evidence of his expunged
criminal record.
Nor was any right violated by the Division's decision not to use such evidence.
The Division's decision does not rely on this evidence. It was excluded. The Board was
instructed on several occasions not to consider or speculate concerning the expunged
criminal record. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the limited comment on this topic affected the outcome of the proceedings.
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-l 6(4) (West 2004) (petitioner must show that he has been
substantially prejudiced by the agency's alleged error). This is especially so where the
Department did not rely upon this information in any manner in its review of the
Division's decision.

11

Petitioner's expunged criminal record was not admitted into evidence. The Board
was instructed to not consider it in any manner. The Department correctly ruled that any
error involved was harmless and that decision should be affirmed on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, respondent asks this Court to affirm the
Department's decision upholding the revocation of the petitioner's licenses.
RESPONDENT DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION
Respondent-appellee does not request oral argument and a published opinion in
this matter. The questions raised in this appeal, having already been decided by this
Court and the Utah Supreme Court in published opinions, are not such that oral argument
or a published opinion is necessary, though respondents desire to participate in oral
argument if such is held by the Court.
Respectfully submitted this

JJ

day of August, 2007.

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney Genera]
Attorney for Respondent - Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondent - Appellee, postage prepaid, to the following on this dJ
2007:
Randy L. Tippets
5123 South 550 West
Ogden, Utah 84405
Petitioner/Appellant
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day of August,

ADDENDUM "A

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-3.5 (West 2004) Rules having the effect of law.
(1) An agency's written statement is a rule if it conforms to the definition of a rule under
Section 63-46a-2, but the written statement is not enforceable unless it is made as a rule
in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.
(2) An agency's written statement that is made as a rule in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter is enforceable and has the effect of law.
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-15 (West 2004) Retention of expunged records — Agencies.
(1) The division shall keep, index, and maintain all expunged records of arrests and convictions.
(2) Employees of the division may not divulge any information contained in its index to
any person or agency without a court order, except to the following:
(a) the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(b) the Peace Officer Standards and Training;
(c) federal authorities, unless prohibited by federal law;
(d) the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing; and
(e) the State Office of Education.
(3) The division may also use the information in its index for the purpose of establishing
good character for issuance of a concealed firearm permit as provided in Section 53-5-704.
(4) A person whose records are released under Subsection (2) shall be given a reasonable
opportunity by the recipient agency to challenge and explain any information in the
records and to challenge the relevancy of that information before a final determination is
made by the agency.
(5) A court may permit inspection or release of an expunged record only upon petition by
the person who is the subject of the record and only to the persons named in the petition.
(6) (a) For judicial sentencing, a court may order any records sealed under this section to
be opened and admitted into evidence.
(b) The records are confidential and are available for inspection only by the court, parties,
counsel for the parties, and any other person who is authorized by the court to inspect them.
(c) At the end of the action or proceeding, the court shall order the records sealed again.
(7) Records released under this section are classified as protected under Section 63-2-304
and are accessible only as provided under Title 63, Chapter 2, Part 2, Access to Records.
Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-12(3) & (7). Agency Review.
(3) Content of a Request for Agency Review - Transcript of Hearing - Service.
(a) The content of a request for agency review shall be in accordance with
Subsection 63-46b- 12(l)(b). The request for agency review shall include a copy
of the order that is the subject of the request,
(b) A party requesting agency review shall set forth any factual or legal basis
in support of that request, including adequate supporting arguments and citation

to appropriate legal authority and to the relevant portions of the record
developed during the adjudicative proceeding.
(c) If a party challenges a finding of fact in the order subject to review, the
party must demonstrate, based on the entire record, that the finding is not
supported by substantial evidence. A party challenging the facts bears the
burden to marshal or gather all of the evidence in support of a finding and to
show that despite such evidence, the finding is not supported by substantial
evidence. The failure to so marshal the evidence permits the executive director
to accept a division's findings of fact as conclusive. A party challenging a
legal conclusion must support the argument with citation to any relevant
authority and also cite to those portions of the record that are relevant to
that issue.
(d) If the grounds for agency review include any challenge to a determination of
fact or conclusion of law as unsupported by or contrary to the evidence, the
party seeking agency review shall order and cause a transcript of the record
relevant to such finding or conclusion to be prepared. When a request for agency
review is filed under such circumstances, the party seeking review shall certify
that a transcript has been ordered and shall notify the department when the
transcript will be available for filing with the department. The party seeking
agency review shall bear the cost of the transcript.
(e) A party seeking agency review shall, in the manner described in R151-46b-8,
file and serve upon all other parties copies of correspondence, pleadings, and
other submissions. If an attorney enters an appearance on behalf of a party,
service shall thereafter be made upon that attorney, instead of directly to the
party.
(f) Failure to comply with this rule may result in dismissal of the request for
agency review.
(7) Standard of Review.
The standards for agency review correspond to the standards for judicial review
of formal adjudicative proceedings, as set forth in Subsection 63-46b-16(4).
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BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERC
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and
ORDER ON REVIEW

Randy T. Tippets,
DOPL
PETITIONER

INTRODUCTION
Randy T. Tippets ("Petitioner") brings this request for agency review before the
Department of Commerce ("Department"), challenging an adverse decision from the
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("Division").

STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 63-46b-12, and Utah Administrative Code, R151-46b-12.

ISSUES REVIEWED
1.

Whether the Petitioner properly challenged the Division's findings of fact.

2.

Whether Petitioner established that the Division committed an error in its

proceedings regarding an expunged criminal record.
3.
arguments.

Whether the Executive Director may consider Petitioner's new evidence and

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Division made various findings in its Order (under both the Findings

of Fact section of the Order and the Conclusions of Law section).1 The Division's
findings are hereby adopted and summarized as follows:
a.

Petitioner was initially licensed to practice as a pharmacist in the
State of Utah on March 13, 1981, and his controlled substances
license was issued on August 2, 1983.2

b.

Pursuant to a disciplinary7 action in Case No. OPL-88-79,
Petitioner's license to dispense controlled substances was
immediately suspended on October 27, 1988 pending a further
order by the Division. On January 31, 1989, Petitioner's licenses
to practice as a pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances
were suspended for six months. Three months of the suspension
was applied retroactively, the remaining three-month suspension
was stayed in favor of a five-year probationary period and
Petitioner's licenses were subject to certain terms and conditions.

c.

By Order dated February 10, 1992, some restrictions of the 1989
Order were terminated, additional probationary conditions were
imposed, and Petitioner's Licenses were reinstated to full
privileges on March 23, 1994.

d.

In June and July 2001, while employed by K-Mart and while
designated as the pharmacist-in-charge, Petitioner remained in the
pharmacy throughout the night after one of his regular shifts to
conduct controlled substance audits. Petitioner conducted no
audits, however.

e.

On August 19, 200L K-Mart terminated Petitioner's employment
for violations of company policy. An audit on August 21, 2001 by
K-Mart resulted in the filing of theft and loss reports with the Drug
Enforcement Agency ("DEA"'), reporting various missing
medications and controlled substances. There was insufficient
evidence to find that Petitioner unlawfully possessed or used any of
these missing controlled substances.

]

Those findings in the Division's Order that are within the Conclusions of Law section are identified
below.
2
Petitioners license to practice as a pharmacist and his controlled substances license are sometimes
collectively referred herein as "Petitioners Licenses."
2

f.

Petitioner became employed by Dan's Pharmacy in October 2003.
After completing an evening shift on October 22, 2003, Petitioner
remained at the pharmacy until the next morning when he was
discovered by his supervisor, sitting in the back office with a fan
blowing on him. Dan's Pharmacy conducted a controlled
substance audit on October 23, 2003, subsequently filed a theft and
loss report of Alprazolam, Phentermine, and Methylphenidate with
the DEA, and suspended Petitioner's employment.

g.

Petitioner's urine drug test conducted on October 24, 2003
revealed the presence of amphetamines for which he had no lawful
prescription. Petitioner's employment at Dan's Pharmacy was
terminated on October 30, 2003.

h.

Petitioner used controlled substances from Dan's Pharmacy wrhich
were not prescribed for him, and such use was to the extent that it
may have rendered him unsafe to practice pharmacy. (Conclusions
of Law, p. 8).

"i.

Petitioner acknowledged that he is an addict and some counseling
would be beneficial to him. (Conclusions of Law, p.7).

j.

Petitioner has resumed his controlled substance abuse and again
requires intensive treatment. (Conclusions of Law, p. 10).

k.

Petitioner's access to controlled substances enabled his relapse of
unauthorized controlled substance use. (Conclusions of Law, p. 9).

2.

On August 17, 2004, the Division filed a Notice of Agency Action against

Petitioner's licenses. The Notice incorporated a Petition with four counts of misconduct,
including the failure to maintain good moral character, unlawfully obtaining/using
controlled substances, substance abuse to the extent it may have rendered Petitioner
unsafe to practice pharmacy, and gross negligence.
3.

A hearing was held before the Division and the State Board of Pharmacy

on February 28 and March 1, 2006.
4.

On May 24, 2006, the Division revoked Petitioner's Licenses.
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5.

Petitioner filed a request for agency review on June 22, 2006.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The standards for agency review correspond to those established by the

Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 63-46b-16(4). Utah
Admin. Code R151-46b-12(7).
2.

The Division may revoke, suspend or otherwise sanction the license of

any licensee who engages in unprofessional conduct as defined by statute or rule under
Title 58 of the Utah Code. Utah Code Ann. § 58-l-401(2)(a). Utah Code Ann. § 58-1501(2) defines unprofessional conduct to include:
(a) violating .. .any statute, rule, or order regulating an occupation or
profession under this title;
(e) engaging in conduct, including the use of intoxicants, drugs, narcotics
or similar chemicals, to the extent that the conduct does or might
reasonably be considered to, impair the ability of the licensee...to safely
engage in the occupation or profession...
It is unlawful for a person to knowingly and intentionally possess or use acontrolled
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription from a practitioner. Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i).
3.

Subsequent to a hearing on the allegations in the Petition, the Division

and the licensing Board dismissed Counts I (Failure to Maintain Good Moral Character)
and IV (Gross Negligence). They concluded that Petitioner engaged in unprofessional
conduct when he obtained and used controlled substances from Dan's Pharmacy that
were not prescribed for him (Count 11) and when he abused controlled substances to the
extent that it may have rendered him unsafe to practice pharmacy (Count III).
4

4.

A person requesting agency review has the burden to specifically state

the basis for review. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12; Utah Admin. Code § R151-46b12(1). He further has the burden of establishing that the Division has committed an
error in its proceedings based upon the applicable law and the facts of his case, and he
must set forth any factual or legal basis in support of that request, including adequate
supporting arguments and citation to the hearing record and to appropriate legal
authority. See Sections R151-46b-12(3)(b), Rl 51-46b-12(7), and 63-46b-16(4).
5.

Petitioner makes numerous arguments on agency review, including the

following:
a.

that the amphetamines found in his system resulted from an herbal
weight loss pill from Brazil named Emigrace;

b.

that during the proceedings, references to his prior criminal record
which had been expunged were illegal and deprived him of a fair
hearing;

c.

that the Division's counsel incorrectly stated that Petitioner's
urinalysis revealed methamphetamines when it was actually
amphetamines;

d.

that David Davis's testimony should be stricken, because he was
not an expert on drugs;

e.

that certain of Petitioner's exhibits were wrongfully excluded from
the record;

f.

regarding Petitioner's employment at K-Mart. that witness Rob
Vagstad lied about Petitioner being assigned as the pharmacist in
charge and about the correct date of his termination, and that other
employees falsified a DEA form;

g.

that the Division's action against him was in retaliation for a
complaint that Petitioner had made to the Governor's office on
another matter; and
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h.

that the Division's proceedings were not completed in a timely
manner.

Petitioner requests an investigation and sanctions based upon the mention of his
expunged criminal record during the Division's proceedings.
A.

The Division's Findings
6.

The party challenging an agency's findings of fact must show that the

finding is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record. Section 63-46b-16(4)(g). uAn appellant must first marshal all the evidence in
support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below."
Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App 216, \ 6, 138 P.3d 63, citations omitted; Utah Admin.
Code R151-46b-12(3)(c). The failure to so marshal the evidence permits the Executive
Director to accept the findings of fact made by the Division as conclusive. Utah Admin.
Code R151-46b-12(3)(c); Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998).
7.

Petitioner appears to challenge the Division's findings that he obtained

and used controlled substances from Dan's Pharmacy when he did not have a proper
prescription from a practitioner for such substances, that he abused those substances to
the extent that it may have rendered him unsafe to practice pharmacy, and that he is an
addict who has relapsed into unauthorized use of controlled substances. However,
Petitioner has failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of these findings and
has failed to show that despite such evidence, there was substantial evidence in the
record to the contrary. Petitioner reviews only the evidence that supports his position
6

(for example, that an over-the-counter medication can cause a false positive result in a
drug test, that a Brazilian diet pill was responsible for the amphetamines in his system,
that he was not the pharmacist-in-charge at K-Mart, and that K-Mart employees forged
certain DEA forms), and he leaves it to the Executive Director to sort out what evidence
actually supported the Division's findings. Not only does this method fail to meet the
marshaling requirement, but Petitioner essentially asks the Executive Director to
reconsider the validity of the evidence and asks her to substitute her judgment for that of
the Division on contested factual issues.
8.

The Executive Director will accept the Division's findings of fact as

conclusive due to Petitioner's failure to marshal the evidence,3 and she declines to
substitute her judgment for that of the Division and the licensing Board. See Sweet at ^|
7, citing Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, ^ 28, 80 P.3d 553 (in which the Court of
Appeals declined to substitute its judgment for that of the District Court). Where there
is competing evidence, it is the province of the Division and the Board, not the
Executive Director, to resolve conflicting evidence. Where inconsistent inferences can
be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Division and the Board to draw the
inferences, even if the Executive Director may have come to a different conclusion.
Carter v. Labor Comm 'n Appeals Board, 2006 UT App 477, ^j 17, 566 Utah Adv. Rep.
27, citing Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 116 P.23 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
See also, State v. Waldron, 2002 UT App 175, ^ 16, 51 P.3d 21 (holding that a jury is
entitled to use its own judgment on what evidence to believe and may draw reasonable
inferences from that evidence).
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9.

For the purposes of agency review, the facts that were critical in

upholding Counts II and III were supported by substantial evidence that was largely
based upon Petitioner's admissions, which was essentially that he had resumed
amphetamine abuse. Although Petitioner marshals only his testimony that he has not
illegally used amphetamines since the 1989 disciplinary action, there is substantial
testimony that he resumed his amphetamine abuse. Petitioner admitted that he had an
addiction to amphetamines. Hearing Transcript, 491:8-14; 515:1-22. Because of his
problems, before beginning his employment with K-Mart, Petitioner asked for a parttime schedule and that a pharmacy technician work with him at all times. Hearing
Transcript, 417:1-25; 418:1-25; 502:22-25; 503:1-14. Petitioner does not crave and
does not use them [amphetamines] all the time, but he does crave and does use them
sometimes. Hearing Transcript, 515:5-25. He has learned to exercise to deal with his
problem, but if he has to give up exercise, then he starts slipping back. Hearing
Transcript, 521:18-22. After drug treatment around 1988, and after a year or two in
Alcoholics Anonymous, Petitioner fell into old habits. Hearing Transcript 524:7-25.
When his work hours increased and he had to quit walking. Petitioner "probably took a
few things [he] shouldn't have." Hearing Transcript. 522:4-25; 523:1-7. Finally.
Petitioner admitted that he probably could use an evaluation and some counseling.
Hearing Transcript, 514:22-25; 515:12-14; 516:2-8; 525:4-23. Thus, there was
substantial evidence to support the finding that Petitioner is again abusing
amphetamines.

' Subsection R15l-46b-12(3)(c), Campbell, at 808
8

10.

In addition, Petitioner admitted that he spent the night at Dan's Pharmacy

on October 22, 2003, and that it is not normal and not a good idea to do so. Hearing
Transcript, 486:1-15. There was substantial evidence presented that Petitioner had a fan
blowing on him the next morning and looked unwell, that three types of controlled
substances were missing from Dan's after Petitioner spent the night there, and that
Petitioner subsequently tested positive for amphetamines. Although Petitioner denied
that he took the missing medications, that his positive drug test resulted from the
missing medications and that he was abusing medications while spending the night at
Dan's, the Division and the Board considered his credibility and compared his
testimony against that of the other witnesses, against the documentary evidence, and
against his own admissions and inconsistent statements. The Division and the Board
were entitled to draw reasonable inferences from all the evidence to conclude that
Petitioner took the missing medications from Dan's pharmacy and as a result, tested
positive for amphetamines. Waldron, *j] 16.
11.

During the Division hearing, for example, Petitioner attempted to explain

the amphetamine results on his drug test as over-the-counter diet pills or a Vicks
inhaler. Through Dr. Poulsen, he offered the explanation that over-the-counter diet
pills, such as Fen Phen from Brazil, result in false positives for amphetamines. Hearing
Transcript, 287:6-24. However, Dr. Poulsen stated that his testimony was based upon
what his patients have told him about false positives and not on any independent drug
testing. Hearing Transcript. 288:19-25; 289:1. In addition, Dr. Poulsen had no training
in toxicology. Hearing Transcript, 290:8-10. The Division and the Board were entitled
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to consider the weight of Dr. Poulsen's testimony against that of David Davis, who
testified about the drug testing procedures used by Dan's Pharmacy, which included a
two-step process designed to weed out false positive results from over-the-counter
medications. Hearing Transcript, 117:1-5; 118:1-25; 141:4-7: 145:14-19.
12.

Petitioner has failed to establish that the Administrative Law Judge

("ALJ") who conducted the hearing erred in admitting the testimony of David Davis.
Petitioner argues that Mr. Davis was not a physician and not an expert on drugs, that he
should not have been permitted to testily as to whether the missing drugs from Dan's
Pharmacy could yield a positive amphetamine drug test. (Petitioner's Reply
Memorandum, pp. 2-3). However, the record indicates that Davis was not offered as an
expert on drugs. Rather, he was called to testify regarding his knowledge in human
resources and the drug testing policies and procedures used at Dan's Pharmacy, as well
as providing a foundation for the drug test given to Petitioner. The ALJ overruled
Petitioner's objection on that basis.4 Hearing Transcript, 131:14-21. Petitioner failed to
establish that Davis did not have the knowledge to testify regarding the drug testing
policies and procedures, and his testimony was properly admitted. Mr. Davis properly
testified about the two-step screening process used at Dan's Pharmacy. Hearing
Transcript, 116:21-25; pp. 117-120.
13.

It is not necessary to address Petitioner's claims regarding the evidence

admitted with regard to Petitioner's work at K-Mart, including Petitioner's concerns

4

In fact, it was Petitioner who asked Davis as to whether certain medications could yield a positive result
for amphetamines, even though he had previously objected to Davis providing such expert testimony.
Hearing Transcript, 132:6-7.
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regarding Robert Vagstad's testimony (that Petitioner was the pharmacist-in-charge; the
date of his termination at K-Mart) and Petitioner's allegations that K-Mart employees
forged a DEA form. The Executive Director has accepted the Division's findings as
conclusive due to Petitioner's failure to properly marshal the evidence. Moreover, even
though the Division found that Petitioner was the pharmacist-in-charge at K-Mart, such
finding was not necessary to the ultimate conclusion to uphold Counts II and III of the
petition. It was the evidence submitted with respect to Petitioner's employment at
Dan's pharmacy (spending the night there, missing medications, positive amphetamine
drug test) and Petitioner's prior disciplinary record that caused the Division and the
Board to uphold Counts II and III in the Petition?
B.

Expunged Record
14.

The Executive Director applies the correction-of-error standard when

reviewing the Division's interpretation of general questions of law, granting no
deference to the Division's decisions. Associated Gen. Contrs. v. Bd. of Oil, Gas &
Mining, 2001 UT
112,1 18.38P.3d291.
15.

Petitioner claims that the Division Investigator illegally referred to his

expunged criminal record, and argues that the Board members were so affected by this
reference that he did not receive a fair hearing. He also asks for an investigation and

"It is also not necessary to delve into Petitioner's claims that the Division's counsel wrongfully referred to
the drug test result as positive for methamphetamines. The record clearly indicates that the test yielded a
positive result for amphetamines. Counsel's reference to methamphetamines was harmless error that did
not affect the outcome of the case. Morton lnt'l. Inc. v Siate Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah
1991).
11

sanctions.
16.

"'Expungement* means the sealing or destruction of a criminal record,

including records of the investigation, arrest, detention, or conviction of the petitioner."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-9(5). When one's criminal record has been expunged and the
person properly serves an administrative agency with notice of the expungement, the
agency may not divulge information contained in the expunged portion of the criminal
record. Utah Code Ann.. §§ 77-18-14(2) and (5). However, due to its responsibility to
protect the public, the Division may receive information regarding expunged records
from the Criminal Investigations and Technical Services Division within the
Department of Public Safety. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-15(2); JJ.W. v. State, 2001 UT
App271,123,33P.3d59.
17.

Contrary to Petitioner's arguments, the ALJ did not admit any

information from the expunged record into evidence. The issue of the expunged record
was first raised when the Division Investigator was asked why the Division filed a
disciplinary action against Petitioner in 1989. Hearing Transcript, 168:12-22. The
Investigator said that Petitioner had a criminal record that was expunged. Id Petitioner
promptly stated that he did not want that information to come into the record, at which
point the ALJ considered Petitioner's objections and notified the parties that he would
review the prior disciplinary orders in camera as well as the expungement laws and then
would rule on whether the information from the expunged record was admissible.
Hearing Transcript. 186:10-22: 187:7-12. In the meantime, the ALJ advised the parties
and the Board that there would be no further questions regarding the expunged record.
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Hearing Transcript, 199:5-25; 200:1-25; 201:1-2. At the beginning of the second day,
the ALJ upheld Petitioner's objection, and notified the parties and the Board that they
were not to speculate or concern themselves with any information regarding the
expunged record. Hearing Transcript, 262:4-25. The ALJ restated this ruling again
when Board members indicated their confusion over the admissibility of the expunged
record. Hearing Transcript, 398:24-25; 399:1-19; 491:18-25.
18.

Petitioner claims that the mere mention of the expunged record was

illegal. Petitioner's Reply Memorandum, p. 4. The expungement statute prohibits an
agency from disclosing information in an expunged record. Subsection 77-18-14(5).
Here, the Investigator did not provide any information regarding the criminal record that
was expunged. In addition, any mention of the expunged record during the Division
hearing was harmless error, because there is no reasonable likelihood that any such error
affected the outcome of the case. Morton Int'l at 584. The Division's Order indicates
that the expunged criminal record was not the basis for the findings and conclusions
supporting the Division's decision to revoke Petitioner's license. The Division's Order
contains no mention of the expunged record or any criminal conduct that resulted in the
prior disciplinary action against Petitioner.6 In the contrary, the Order indicates that
Petitioner has an amphetamine abuse problem (based upon his admissions), and that
Petitioner had a prior disciplinary record. Thus, any reference to the expunged criminal
record was harmless.

Because it is not clear from the record whether Subsection 77-18-15(2)(d) was considered below, these
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on Review will not address whether the Divisioncould
consider Petitioner's expunged record in light of its authority under Subsection 77-18-15(2)(d) to receive
information from expunged records.
13

19.

Finally, although Petitioner asks for sanctions and an investigation, he

has failed to show that the Executive Director has any authority under the expungement
laws to initiate such an investigation or to issue any sanctions.
C.

New Evidence, New Arguments, Lack of Briefing
20.

Petitioner raises new evidence and arguments upon agency review that

cannot be considered by the Executive Director. He argues that the Brazilian diet drug
"Emigrace'* caused the positive result for amphetamines, and he refers to media
coverage regarding Emigrace. Petitioner's Memorandum August 24, 2006, p. 2.
Petitioner also submitted with his reply memorandum a July 7, 2004 letter from him to
someone at the Governor's Office (presumably in support of his argument that the
Division's action against him was retaliatory in nature). This new evidence and
accompanying arguments are hereby stricken as not part of the Division's record and not
properly preserved for agency review.
21.

The Executive Director applies the same standards for agency review as

those used for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Admin. Code
R151 -46b-12(7). "The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been
substantially prejudiced../'1 Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the record on appeal may be supplemented only ''because of an omission or
exclusion, or a dispute as to the accuracy of reporting, and not to introduce new
material into the recordr State v Law, 2003 UT App 228. H 2. 75 P.3d 923. citing
Olson v Park-Craig-Olson, Inc . 815 P.2d 1356. 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis
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added). Petitioner does not claim that there was any error in reporting what occurred in
the Division's proceeding. Although Petitioner introduced at the hearing his theory that
over-the-counter diet pills could provide false positives for amphetamines, he did not
identify Emigrace as such a diet pill, nor did he introduce any evidence that he had
actually taken Emigrace. It is improper for Petitioner to now attempt to supplement the
record.
22.

In addition, by failing to raise various arguments during the Division's

proceedings and failing to properly brief these arguments, Petitioner failed to properly
preserve those arguments for agency review. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d
844, 847 (Utah 1998) (failure to preserve); Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36,
1J52, citing Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, f74, 73 P.3d 334 (holding that
issues not adequately briefed need not be addressed). These arguments include'
Petitioner's allegations that the current action by the Division is retaliatory in nature,
that certain of his exhibits were wrongfully excluded from the record, that the
Division's proceedings were not completed on a timely basis, and that there was board
member bias.
D.

Summary

23.

In summary. Petitioner failed to properly marshal the evidence in support

of the Division's findings. Therefore, the Executive Director accepts the Division's
findings as conclusive. Based on Petitioner's admissions alone, there was substantial
evidence to support the critical facts that support Counts II and III of the petition. Even
if the Executive Director would have reached a different conclusion after evaluating the
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conflicting evidence, she will not substitute her judgment for that of the Division and
the Board. Petitioner has also failed to establish that there was any error with regard to
an expunged record. Finally, the Executive Director declines to consider various
arguments made by Petitioner, which he failed to raise during the Division's
proceedings, failed to properly preserve, and failed to properly brief.

ORDER ON REVIEW
For the foregoing reasons, the Division's decision revoking Randy T. Tippets'
licenses to practice as a pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances is hereby
affirmed.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review
with the Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order. Any Petition
for Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-16,
Utah Code Annotated. In the alternative, but not required in order to exhaust
administrative remedies, reconsideration may be requested pursuant to Bourgeons v..
Department of Commerce, et ai: 981 P.2d 414 (Utah App. 1999) within 20 days after
the date of this Order pursuant to Section 63-46b-13.

Dated t h i s ' ^ t ^ ~day of February. 2007.

Francine A. Giani. Executive Director
Utah Department of Commerce
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on t h e ^ jday of February, 2007, the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on
Review by first class and certified mail to:

Randy T. Tippets
5123 South 550 West
Ogden, UT 84405

and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to:

F. David Stanley, Director
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Karl Perry, Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
160 East 300 South - Box 140872
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872

Rebekah Brown
Administrative Assistant
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ADDENDUM "C

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
RANDY V J . TIPPETS
TO PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST
AND TO DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

O R D E R
Case No. DOPL-2004-183

The attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommended Order are hereby adopted by the Presiding Officer of
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the
State of Utah.

Respondent's licenses to practice as a pharmacist

and to dispense controlled substances are thus revoked, effective
the date of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the revoked licenses, both wall
and wallet sizes, as well as any embossed certificate, thus be
surrendered to the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing.
Dated th-^s

A,rf

day. of May, 2006

Daniel T. Jon£%
Presiding Officer

'Agency review of this Order may be obtained by filing a
request for agency review with the Executive Director, Department
of Commerce, -..'ithin thirty (30) days after the date of this
Order. The laws and rules governing agency review are found in
Section 63-46b-12 of the Utah Code, and Section R151-46b-12 of
the Utah Administrative Code.

ADDENDUM "D"

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
RANDY T. TIPPETS
TO PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST
AND TO DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

:
FINDINGS OF FACT
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
: AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
:
: Case No. DOPL-2004-183

Appearances:
Karl G. Perry for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
Randy T. Tippets for Respondent
BY THE BOARD:
A February 28 - March 1, 2006 hearing was conducted in the
above-entitled proceeding before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative
Law Judge for the Department of Commerce, and the State Board of
Pharmacy.

Board members present were Betty Yamashita, Shawna

Hanson, Mark A. Munger, Marty Val Hill, Dominic DeRose, Jr., and
Edgar Cortes.

The remaining Board member (Roger B. Fitzpatrick)

was absent.
J. Craig Jackson, Director of the Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing, was also absent.

However, Mr.

Jackson had designated Daniel T. Jones (Division Bureau Manager)
as the substitute presiding officer to review and act upon the
Board's recommendation in this proceeding.
present for the hearing.

Mr. Jones was thus

Thereafter, evidence was offered and received.

The Board

now enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and submits
the following Recommended Order for review and action by the
Division:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this

proceeding has been, licensed to practice as a pharmacist and to
dispense controlled substances in this state.

Respondent was

initially licensed as a pharmacist on March 13, 1981 and his
controlled substance license was issued August 2, 1983.
2.

Pursuant to an October 27, 1988 Order (Case No. OPL-88-

79), Respondent's license to dispense controlled substances was
immediately suspended pending a further order by the Division.
Pursuant to a January 31, 1989 Order, Respondent's licenses to
practice as a pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances
were suspended for six (6) months.
3.

Ninety (90) days of that suspension was applied

retroactively to October 27, 1988.

A stay of enforcement was

entered as to the remaining three (3) months of the suspension
and Respondent's licenses were placed on probation for five (5)
years, subject to certain terms and conditions.
4.

Pursuant to a February 10, 1992 Amended Order, certain

restrictions required by the January 31, 1989 Order were
terminated and additional probationary conditions were imposed.
Respondent's licenses to practice as a pharmacist and dispense
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controlled substances were reinstated to full privileges on March
23, 1994.
5.

Respondent commenced employment as a pharmacist at the

K-mart Pharmacy in South Ogden, Utah on or about February 2001.
Susan Myers was the pharmacist-in-charge.at that time.

Based on

the substantial and credible evidence presented, audits of the
pharmacy controlled substance inventory were conducted on March
25, 2001 and in early May 2001.
6.

Based on the substantial and credible evidence

presented, Respondent was designated as the pharmacist-in-charge
on or about mid June 2001.

He was thus instructed to conduct an

audit of Schedule II controlled substances within approximately
ten (10) days and another audit in late July 2001.
7.

Based on the substantial and credible evidence

presented, Respondent remained in the pharmacy throughout the
night following one of his regularly assigned shifts in mid or
late June 2001.

Respondent also remained in the pharmacy

approximately five (5) hours after his shift was scheduled to end
at 6:00

p.m. on July 8, 2001.

There is a lack of sufficient

evidence Respondent accessed the pharmacy computer as to view any
pornographic Internet websites either that evening or during the
morning of July 9, 2001.
8.

Based on the substantial and more credible evidence

presented, Respondent did not conduct the audits which were to
have been done in late June and late July 2001.

Respondent's

employment at the K-mart Pharmacy was terminated on or about
3

August 19, 2 0 01 due to violations of company policy, bas-ed on his
employer's conclusions that Respondent had failed to maintain
adequate record keeping and that he had engaged in inappropriate
Internet usage.

A controlled substance audit was then conducted

on August 21, 2001.
9.

Based on that audit, a theft and loss report was filed

with the Drug Enforcement Administration.

That report recites

losses of medications in the following dosages and quantities:
Adderall 20mg tablets (406) ; Dexedrine lOmg CR capsules (19) ;
Dexedrine 15mg CR capsules (260); Dextrostat 5mg tablets {106);
Methadone 5mg tablets (200); Methadone lOmg tablets (100);
Hydrocodone/APAP 7.5/500 mg tablets (70); and Hydrocodone/APAP
5/500mg tablets (223).
10.

The theft and loss report also recites the following

losses of medications:

Lortab 7.5mg tablets (59); Norco lOmg

tablets (345); Alprazolam 0.25mg tablets (67); Lorazepam 0.5mg
tablets (103) ; Lorazepam lmg tablets (99) ; Phentermine 3 0mg
capsules (567); Phentermine 37.5mg capsules (200); Didrex 50mg
tablets (99); Diazepam 5mg tablets (41); Clonazepam 0.5mg tablets
(65); and Temazepam 3 0mg capsules (39). There is a lack of
sufficient and credible evidence to find Respondent unlawfully
possessed or used any of the above stated controlled substances.
11.

Respondent commenced employment as a pharmacist with

Associated Retail Stores in mid October 2003.

Carrie Farnsworth

was the pharmacy manager for Dan's Pharmacy where Respondent was
thus employed.

Ms. Farnsworth conducted a controlled substance
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audit of the pharmacy on October 18, 2003 and that audit revealed
no discrepancies in the controlled substance inventory.
12.

Ms. Farnsworth was present at the pharmacy on the

evening of October 22, 2003 to assist Respondent in closing the
pharmacy.

Ms. Farnsworth left the pharmacy shortly before 9:00

p.m. that evening.

She was contacted at home at approximately

7:00 a.m. on October 23, 2003 when Respondent had not turned in
the cash till from the pharmacy for the prior evening.
13.

Based on the more substantial and credible evidence

presented, Ms. Farnsworth arrived at the pharmacy and she found
Respondent sitting in the back office of the pharmacy with a fan
blowing on him.

Based on the substantial and more credible

evidence presented, Respondent informed Ms. Farnsworth that he
was nauseated and he appeared to be irritated and angry.
Respondent left the pharmacy at approximately 9:30 a.m. that
morning after his brother-in-law had arrived to provide
transportation for Respondent.
14.

Respondent's employment with Associated Retail Stores

was suspended on October 23, 2003, pending a controlled substance
audit and drug testing.

A controlled substance audit was

conducted at the pharmacy on October 23, 2003.

Based on that

audit, a theft and loss report was filed with the Drug
Enforcement Administration, which recites losses of medications
in the following doses and quantities:

Alprazolam 0.25mg tablets

(32); Phentermine 37.5mg tablets (8); and Methylphenidate 5mg
tablets (6).
5

15.
24, 2003.

Respondent submitted to a urine drug test on October
Test results revealed the presence of amphetamines.

Respondent had not been lawfully prescribed any medication by any
practitioner as to account for the October 24, 2003 test result.
Respondent's employment with Associated Retail Stores was
terminated on October 30, 2003 due to his violation of company
policies.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division contends Respondent has failed to maintain good
moral character, which is required for his ongoing licensure as a
pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances.

The Division

asserts Respondent has obtained and used controlled substances
which were not prescribed to him by any practitioner and that he
has abused those substances to the extent that it may have
rendered him unsafe to practice pharmacy.
The Division also urges Respondent engaged in grossly
negligent conduct when he failed to perform requried audits and
thus failed to maintain records of controlled substances while
employed at the K-mart Pharmacy.

The Division thus urges that

Respondent's licenses should be revoked for no less than three
(3) years.

Moreover, the Division contends Respondent should be

required to successfully complete chemical dependency,
psychological and physical evaluations and a drug treatment
program before any determination is made whether he might be
subsequently relicensed.
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Respondent acknowledges he is an addict and some counseling
would be beneficial for him.

Respondent asserts he obtained drug

treatment counseling in 1988 and that he attended Alcoholics
Anonymous and support group meetings relative to that treatment.
Respondent contends there is no evidence that he has engaged in
any unprofessional conduct which has caused harm to any pharmacy
customer and he urges that his licenses should not be revoked.
Utah Code Ann. §58-1-401(2) provides the Division may
revoke, suspend, restrict, place on probation, issue a public or
private reprimand to, or otherwise act upon the license of any
licensee who:
(a) . . . has engaged in unprofessional conduct,
as defined by statute or rule under this title;
(d) . . . is unable to practice the
occupation or profession with reasonable
skill and safety because of . . . excessive
use of drugs, narcotics . . . or as a result
of any other mental or physical condition,
when the licensee's condition demonstrates a
threat or potential threat to the public
health, safety or welfare.
§58-1-501(2) generally defines unprofessional conduct to
include:
(a) violating . . . any statute, rule, or
order regulating an occupation or profession
under this title;
(e) engaging in conduct, including the use
of intoxicants, drugs, narcotics or similar
chemicals, to the extent that the conduct
does or might reasonably be considered to,
impair the ability of the licensee . . . to
safely engage in the occupation or
profession;
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(g) practicing . . , an occupation or
profession regulated under this title through
gross incompetence, gross negligence, or a
pattern of incompetency or negligence.
§58-17a-302(1) (f) also provides that a pharmacist must maintain
satisfactory evidence of good moral character as it relates to
his ability to practice pharmacy.
The Board readily finds and concludes Respondent obtained
and used controlled substances from Dan's Pharmacy which were not
prescribed for him by any practitioner and he thus engaged in
unprofessional conduct violative of §58-1-501 (2) (a) .

The Board

also finds and concludes Respondent abused those substances while
so employed to the extent it may have rendered him unsafe to
practice pharmacy and he thus engaged in unprofessional conduct
violative of §58-1-501 (2) (e) . Accordingly, the Board finds and
concludes a proper factual and legal basis exists to enter a
disciplinary sanction as to Respondent's licenses.
The Board has considered the claims made by the Division as
to whether Respondent's conduct establishes his failure to have
maintained good moral character.

The only assertion in this

proceeding which possibly bears on Respondent's moral character
involves his allegedly inappropriate Internet use while employed
at the K-mart Pharmacy.
The Board reiterates its finding that there is a lack of
sufficient and credible evidence that Respondent engaged in any
such conduct.

Accordingly, the Board finds and concludes there
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is no proper factual basis that Respondent lacks good moral
character as required of every pharmacist.
The Board next reiterates its finding that Respondent failed
to conduct audits as required by his employer at the K-mart
Pharmacy.

Respondent may well have been negligent when he did

not ensure that the audits in question were conducted. However,
there is a lack of sufficient and credible evidence that
Respondent was grossly negligent in that regard.

Moreover, there

is a lack of sufficient and credible evidence that Respondent
engaged in a pattern of negligent misconduct as to warrant a
conclusion that he violated §58-1-501(2)(g).
Respondent has engaged in serious unprofessional conduct.
Respondent's access to controlled substances enabled his relapse
of unauthorized controlled substance use.

Moreover, Respondent's

abuse of such controlled substances occurred in.a work setting,
which prompted his failure to properly leave Dan's Pharmacy on
the evening of October 22, 2003 when he was no longer authorized
to remain on the premises.

The Board readily rejects

Respondent's suggestion that he remained in either pharmacy after
his normal working hours because he was performing work-related
tasks that had to be completed.
Respondent knowingly diverted certain controlled substances
from his employer at Dan's Pharmacy for his unauthorized personal
use.

There is no evidence Respondent's conduct resulted in

actual harm to any co-worker, pharmacy customer or the general
public.

However, Respondent's diversion of controlled substances
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and the degree of his impairment due to his unauthorized use of
those controlled substances clearly created a potential for harm
to the public.
There are certain aggravating circumstances which should be
considered in this case. Respondent has been subject to prior
disciplinary action.

His most recent misconduct reveals a

pattern of unauthorized drug use.

Further, Respondent has

engaged in multiple offenses which now subjects his licenses to
disciplinary sanction.
Significantly, Respondent has resumed his controlled
substance abuse.

Despite Respondent's prior efforts which may

have allowed him to demonstrate a meaningful and sustained period
of successful rehabilitation, it is clearly evident Respondent
again requires intensive treatment with a regimen of counseling
and support group meetings to effectively address his current
condition.
The Board thus finds and concludes no proper basis presently
exists to allow Respondent to practice as a pharmacist and to
have any access to controlled substances in that regard.
Moreover, the Board is convinced Respondent must successfully
complete a drug treatment program and establish a pattern.of
diligent attendance at support group meetings before any
determination might be made whether Respondent could safely
resume any practice as a pharmacist in this state.
The Board also finds and concludes that drug treatment
counseling for Respondent should be preceded by psychological and
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physical evaluations to meaningfully identify the issues which
must be addressed.

Accordingly, the Board submits the following

Recommended Order to adequately protect the public and prompt
Respondent's timely pursuit of rehabilitative treatment as a
predicate to any subsequent relicensure to practice as a
pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondent's license to practice as
a pharmacist in this state shall be revoked, effective the date
this Recommended Order may be adopted by the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing.
It is further ordered that Respondent's license to dispense
controlled substances shall also be revoked, effective the date
this Recommended Order may be adopted by the Division.

On behalf of the State Board of Pharmacy, I hereby certify
the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommended Order were submitted to Daniel T. Jones, Substitute
Presiding Officer for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing, on the
*&3r~^—
day of May, 2006 for
his review and action.
.
/J. Steven Eklund
\Adrainistraiive Law Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

1^
I hereby certify that on the
*^
day of May, 2006, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER and FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER was sent first class
mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

RANDY T TIPPETS
5123 S 550 W
OGDEN UT 844 05

t^^k

Kim Lesh
Administrative Secretary

